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Nonbank Banks: A Legitimate Financial
Intermediary Emerges From The Bank Holding
Company Act Loophole.
Nonbank banks represent the financial institutions' recent attempt to avoid
the regulations of the Bank Holding Company Act. The evolution of the non-
bank bank illustrates the vitality of financial markets and technological
change. While banking regulatory statutes have remained static, the dynam-
ics of technology and electronic banking have allowed financial institutions
to transcend the state's traditional borders. When static federal regulations be-
gan to choke profits, financial institutions sought alternatives to traditional
banking. The financial institutions stretched the fabric of banking regula-
tions to their extreme, and the nonbank bank emerged through a loophole in
the Bank Holding Company Act. This article explores the development and
impact of nonbank banking.
I. INTRODUCTION
Financial institutions are at the core of the capitalist free-enter-
prise system.1 Through the United States financial system flows the
money that builds our cities, creates our wealth and provides for the
American way of life.2 The entire system is regulated3 and con-
1. For WESTLAW ® research select the ALLFEDS or NTP database and use this
search query:
Nonbank & "Bank Holding Company Act" or B.H.C.A.
WESTLAW is a registered trademark of West Publishing Company.
This article examines the case law regarding nonbank banks. Although the term
"nonbank banks" seems to be a redundant anomaly, the Federal Reserve defines the
terms "nonbank" and "nonbank banks" differently. For the Federal Reserve, a "non-
bank bank" is a depository institution, and as such must hold reserves with the Fed-
eral Reserve. In contrast, the term "nonbanks" is given a broad general definition by
the Federal Reserve and may include nondepository institutions which are not re-
quired to hold reserves with the Federal Reserve. This article adopts the definitions
used by the Federal Reserve. Thus, the term "nonbank banks" as used in this article
refers to depository institutions, unsupervised by the Federal Reserve under the Bank
Holding Company Act, yet required to hold Federal Reserves.
2. Banks create the "money" that exists in the economy by acting on the incen-
tives of the Federal Reserve's actions. Economists express these actions as a mathe-
matical equation called the multiplier effect. The multiplier effect is easy to illustrate:
if a bank is required to hold 10% reserves and a customer deposits $100, then the bank
will retain $10 and attempt to loan out the remaining $90. When the loaned money is
deposited in another bank, $9 will be retained for reserves and the remaining $81 will
be loaned out. This scenario repeats itself until the funds are exhausted through a se-
ries of banks throughout the economy. The Federal Reserve Board is the agency
which acts as the central controller of the United States banking system. See generally
L. AUERNHEIMER & R. EKELUND JR., THE ESSENTIALS OF MONEY AND BANKING (1982).
3. For the average Sam Saver, the control that the Federal Reserve Board has is
trolled4 by a dual tiered system of state5 and federal laws6 which fre-
quently overlap. These laws represent the efforts of legislators to
provide stability and safety to an important economic sector.7
Today the nonbank bank represents a new form of institution in
the financial system.8 A nonbank bank is a financial institution
which does not engage in commercial lending but maintains only
nondemand deposits.9 Since the nonbank bank is technically not a
bank, it is not subject to the usual morass of federal and state legisla-
tion.10 Through careful structuring, relevant case law, and a loophole
in the Bank Holding Company Act,11 the nonbank bank has become
the major vehicle for large banks and retailers to expand into the fi-
nancial institution arena. 12 Unlike banks, nonbank banks have the
not noticed until it has affected the overall economy. Most citizens behave like a Sam
Saver and deposit their money in what they believe to be a bank. Yet, the financial
institution where Sam Saver deposits his money may not be a bank at all. See gener-
ally infra note 8.
4. The Federal Reserve Board is the agency which implements the fiscal policy of
the United States. It has the fiscal tools necessary to expand or to contract the econ-
omy. The Board controls the economy through four basic sets of controls. The first is
the general regulating power that is granted through the Bank Holding Company Act
of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (1982). The three remaining controls are reserve require-
ments, federal funds rates, and the discount window. These items are most threatened
by the increasing number of nonregulated nonbank banks. See L. AUERNHEIMER & R.
EKELUND, JR., supra note 1, at 231, 242-46. If the economy is growing too slowly, the
Federal Reserve Board may drop the discount rate to increase investment spending
and employment. See Fed Lowers Loan Rate; Prime Drops, L.A. Times, Mar. 8, 1986,
at 1, col. 5.
5. The dual tiered system of banking evolved from the natural division of power
through federalism. Today, the system is composed of the federal system of regula-
tions and the fifty state systems of regulations. The federal regulatory framework con-
sists of essentially three administrative regulatory agencies: the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Federal Reserve, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. CON-
GRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 98TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
FORMATION AND POSERS OF NATIONAL BANKING ASSOCIATIONS - A LEGAL PRIMER 1-
10 (Comm. Print 1983).
6. The federal regulators include the Federal Reserve Board, the Comptroller of
the Currency, and the federal insurance agencies. Id.
7. Id.
8. See Lobell, Nonbank Banks: Controversy Over a New Form of Consumer
Bank, 39 Bus. LAW. 1193 (1984); Note, BankAmerica v. United States -- Legitimizing
Bank Nonbank Interlocks, 33 EMORY L.J. 1103 (1984). Issues regarding innovations in
the financial industry are explored in the following articles: DeVolder, Expansionary
Possibilities for Affiliated Commercial Banks: A Current Dilemma, 16 PAC. L.J. 895
(1985); Note, Product Expansion in the Banking Industry: An Analysis and Revision
of Section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1127 (1985);
Note, Avoiding the Glass-Steagall and Bank Holding Company Acts. An Option for
Bank Product Expansion, 58 IND. L.J. 89 (1983); Note, The Merger of Banking and In-
surance: Will Congress Close the South Dakota Loophole?, 60 NOTRE DAME LAW. 762
(1985).
9. Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 106 S. Ct. 681 (1986).
10. Id.
11. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2)(c) (1982).
12. The identities of the large United States nonbank banks are surprising and
sometimes unconnected with the thought of banking. The nation's largest retailer con-
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ability to develop a nationwide interstate network.
This article will examine the development and merging concepts of
nonbank banks, nonbanks, and interstate nonbank banking. The dis-
cussion will initially focus on the historical growth and control of the
financial system. Secondly, actual federal and state legislation and
corresponding case law, which prompted the evolution of the non-
bank bank, will be discussed. Finally, there will be a review of the
impact of the nonbank bank on the future of interstate banking.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE U.S. NONBANK BANKING SYSTEM
A. The Framework of Regulations
The failure of banks during the era of the Great Depression
prompted the legislators to break up large banks which engaged in
securities underwriting, insurance, and banking.13 At the time the
laws were proposed, the general citizenry of the United States lacked
confidence in the existing financial system and was reluctant to pro-
cess transactions through it.14 By breaking up conglomerate financial
glomerate, Sears, Roebuck & Co., is often cited as the most aggressive newcomer to
nonbank banking. Sears is developing its "Discover Card" to be a major competitor to
Visa and Mastercard. With this card, customers can access automated teller machines
at 5,428 locations and 800 retail stores nationwide. The card will connect customers
with the Sears Financial Network, allowing them access to savings and money market
deposit accounts, certificates of deposit, and IRA's. J.C. Penney Co. also operates lim-
ited service banks. See Cahan & Ellis, Nonbanks: Who's Getting The Bucks -- and
Who's Not, Bus. WK., Feb. 10, 1986, at 67. These types of nonbanks are usually re-
ferred to as consumer lenders. The group includes the insurance-brokerage giants
such as Prudential/Bache/PruCapital, American Express, and Merrill Lynch. The
consumer lending of the auto companies, such as Ford Motor and General Motors, is
also considered nonbanking. In addition, the list includes the big names associated
with lending and banking like BankAmerica Corporation, Citicorp, First Interstate
Bancorp, Security Pacific Corporation, Beneficial Corporation, Wells Fargo & Co., and
Crocker National Corporation. K. COOPER & D. FRASER, BANKING DEREGULATION
AND THE NEW COMPETITION IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 199 (1980).
Nonbanks that are categorized as consumer lenders may see their profits shrink on
credit card operations due to the new tax code. Under the new code, consumer inter-
est is no longer deductible. See Tax Reform Act of 1986 Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 511(b),
1986 U.S. CODE CONST. & ADMIN. NEWS Pamphlet 9A, 162 (100 Stat.) (to be codified at
I.R.C. § 163) (disallows deductions for nonbusiness interest expense). Yet, traditional
equity loans, usually made by a bank, retain their deductibility. See id. § 511(b)(h)(D).
Thurs, consumers may have a tax incentive to use equity loans, instead of nonbank
consumer credit cards.
13. The Glass-Steagall Act attempts to separate these functions of banking. The
terminology "Glass-Steagall Act" refers to sections 16, 20, 21, and 32 of the Banking
Act of 1933, 49 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified in various sections including 12 U.S.C. §§ 24,
78, 377, 378 (1982)).
14. The depositors of large banks often created the collapse of their own institu-
tions by causing a "run" on the banks' reserves. In the 1930's, the banks were still
institutions and creating the Federal Reserve Banking System, Con-
gress restored the public's confidence in the financial system.15
1. The Douglas Amendment
The Douglas Amendment16 to the Bank Holding Company Act
grants individual states the power to control interstate banking.17
The amendment removes the Federal Reserve Board's power to ap-
prove any acquisitions by a bank holding company or a bank in one
state or banks in another state,' 8 unless certain conditions are met.
The Act confers upon the states the power to grant interstate bank-
ing by providing for it in specific statutory language. The amend-
ment, however, still retains a dual tiered system of federal and state
regulation. Thus, if the states specifically provide for interstate
banking, the Federal Reserve Board must still approve any interstate
acquisitions under the Bank Holding Company Act.19
In Huston v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,20
the Eighth Circuit interpreted the Federal Reserve Board's authority
and responsibility when the Douglas Amendment interacts with state
law. The Huston case concerned the acquisition of nonvoting shares
in Iowa bank holding companies by out-of-state bank holding compa-
nies.2 1 The Board concluded that the two transactions did not need
Board approval because only nonvoting shares were involved. Hus-
ton, the superintendent of banking for the State of Iowa, appealed
the decision as a violation of both the Douglas Amendment and Iowa
locked into the gold standard; this hampered their ability to respond to such immedi-
ate demands for funds. After the problems of the banks in the 1930's, the general pub-
lic was naturally reluctant to leave their money in banks. See generally L. SULLIVAN,
PRELUDE TO PANIC: THE STORY OF THE BANKING HOLIDAY (1936).
15. As the United States left the gold standard, the economy boomed and almost
all sectors of the economy prospered. The resurgence in the economy made many citi-
zens feel more secure, although the banks were only slightly safer. Id.
16. [N]o application . . . shall be approved [by the Board] which will permit
any bank holding company or any subsidiary thereof to acquire, directly or in-
directly, any voting shares of, interest in, or all or substantially all of the as-
sets of any additional bank located outside of the State in which the
operations of such bank holding company's banking subsidiaries were princi-
pally conducted on [July 1, 1966], or the date on which such company became
a bank holding company, whichever is later, unless the acquisition of such
shares or assets of a State bank by an out-of-State bank holding company is
specifically authorized by the statute laws of the State in which such bank is
located, by language to that effect and not merely by implication.
12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982) (emphasis added).
17. Id.
18. The Douglas Amendment applies only when the prior approval of the Federal
Reserve Board is required. South Dakota v. National Bank of South Dakota, 335 F.2d
444, 449 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 970 (1965).
19. Transactions are approved only if they meet the requirements of 12 U.S.C.
§ 1841(a)(3) (1982).
20. 758 F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1985).
21. Id. at 277.
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state law.22
The court determined that there were three basic levels of protec-
tion provided by the Bank Holding Company Act to prevent undue
control and concentration through interstate banking acquisitions. 23
First, section three of the Act gave the Board wide supervisory dis-
cretion to control the indirect and direct acquisitions of banks by
bank holding companies. Thus, if a bank or holding company wanted
to be acquired or controlled, the Board gave its approval as re-
quired.24 Second, Board approval was also required for stock acquisi-
tions by bank holding companies if more than five percent of the
outstanding stock was obtained after the acquisition. 25 The Board
was given the power to determine whether a bank holding company
''exercises a 'controlling influence over the management or policies of
[another] bank or company.' "26 The third level of protection granted
by the Douglas Amendment was the state power to "check undue
concentrations of banking resources."27 Thus, the Act provided two
federal checks and one state check against banking concentration.
The Eighth Circuit disagreed with the superintendent's claims and
described the Board's duties under the Douglas Amendment.28 First,
the court determined that every application for an interstate acquisi-
tion need not be approved by the Board. The court rejected the su-
perintendent's claim that the Douglas Amendment required the
Board to give mandatory review to all acquisitions by holding compa-
nies. Instead, the court adopted a limited view of the Board's role
under the Amendment. The court interpreted the Douglas Amend-
ment as pertaining only to mandatory Board approvals under the
Bank Holding Company Act. In Huston, the Board was not required
to grant approval since the Douglas Amendment did not apply.29
Second, the court determined that mandatory review by the Board
was conditioned on "direct or indirect ownership or control of the
corporation whose shares were being purchased." 30 The superinten-
22. 12 U.S.C. § 1848 (1982).
23. Huston, 758 F.2d at 277-78.
24. Id. at 277; 12 U.S.C. §§ 1842(a)(1), (a)(2).
25. The acquisition may be by direct or indirect means. Additionally, other means
which give the bank holding company control of 5 percent of the bank's voting shares
may effectuate an acquisition. Huston, 758 F.2d at 278. See also 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(3).
26. Huston, 758 F.2d at 278 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2)(c)).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 279-84.
29. Id. at 279-80. The Amendment applies only "if the interstate transactions were
subject to mandatory review by the Board under § 3(a) of the Act." Id. at 280.
30. The superintendent argued that the statute was to be read broadly so as to re-
dent argued that since the acquisition application before the Board
involved the same company acquiring a nonvoting interest, the Board
should review the application.31 However, in this case, there was no
evidence that the companies purchasing nonvoting shares could exer-
cise any substantial degree of control. Without proof of the requisite
element of control, the Board was not required to act under section
three of the Act. Thus, absent mandatory review by the Board, the
Douglas Amendment could not apply. While acknowledging that
there may be dangers involved in "nonvoting equity investments,"3 2
the court found that the Board had acted properly. Finally, since the
Douglas Amendment did not apply, the Board was not required to
test the transactions under state law.33
Third, the court determined that the Board was only required to
grant limited hearings in reviewing interstate bank transactions. The
superintendent argued that the Board was required to grant formal
evidentiary hearings. However, the court found that under the Act,
the Board was required to grant formal evidentiary hearings only
when material facts were in dispute. Thus, since there were no mate-
rial facts in dispute in this case, the Board properly refused the su-
perintendent's request for a hearing.34
a. Interstate Financial Acquisitions
In Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System, 35 the United States Supreme Court interpreted the
powers and limitations of the Douglas Amendment. Northeast con-
cerned state legislation36 which attempted to limit interstate bank ac-
quisitions to one geographic area. Massachusetts and Connecticut
provided for the interstate acquisitions of out-of-state bank holding
companies. The holding companies could acquire an out-of-state
holding company only if the particular state had a reciprocal
statute.37
In this case, the states wanted to keep interstate banking limited to
bank holding companies with their principal place of business in the
northeastern section of the United States. They claimed that the
quire Board review of applications, regardless of control. However, the court applied a
much narrower view. It determined that to prompt mandatory review, the holding
company would have to create a subsidiary in the company whose shares were being
acquired. Id. at 281.
31. Id. at 282.
32. Id. at 283.
33. Id.
34. Huston, 758 F.2d at 284.
35. 105 S. Ct. 2545 (1985).
36. See inkfra notes 143-46.
37. A reciprocal state statute allows interstate acquisitions only if the state where
the purchasing bank has its principal place of business allows the same type of inter-
state purchases.
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Douglas Amendment allowed the restrictive state legislation. North-
east Bancorp, however, claimed that the acquisitions permitted under
these statutes were prohibited by the Bank Holding Company. Act
and violated the compact, commerce, and equal protection clauses of
the United States Constitution.38
The Court found that state reciprocal interstate banking statutes
did not violate the commerce clause.39 Since Congress had spoken on
the issue of interstate commerce, there were no dormant commerce
clause issues in Northeast. The Court admitted that if the states had
acted alone to prevent out-of-state acquisitions, such actions would
have violated the commerce clause. The Court noted, however, that
Congress can validate a commerce clause violation. Hence, when
Congress legislates in such a manner, "state actions which it plainly
authorizes are invulnerable to constitutional attack under the Com-
merce Clause." 4 0 Thus, the interstate banking statutes did not vio-
late the commerce clause.
The Court also rejected Northeast's claim that the statutes violated
the compact clause.41 The Justices explained that the compact clause
was intended to prevent the states from obtaining too much political
power. The inherent problem in such compacts is that they raise the
possibility of the states "encroach[ing] upon or interfer[ing] with the
just supremacy of the United States."42 The Court proceeded to de-
scribe several "indicia" which would show that an unlawful compact
existed. Since the Court found no such "indicia," the statutes did not
enhance the political power of the New England states and there was
no violation of the compact clause.43
The Court also failed to find a violation of the equal protection
clause.44 The Court based its decision on the rationale that the states
were "not favoring local corporations at the expense of out of state
corporations." 45 Rather, since banking has traditionally been re-
garded as a local concern, the Court distinguished out-of-state corpo-
rations domiciled in New England from other out-of-state
corporations. In this case, the states were attempting to legislate for
two important purposes: increasing the number of banking institu-
38. Northeast, 105 S. Ct. at 2548.
39. Id. at 2553-54.
40. Id. at 2554.
41. Id. (referring to U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 10, cl. 3).
42. Northeast, 105 S. Ct. at 2554.
43. Id. at 2554-55.
44. Id. at 2555-56.
45. Id. at 2555.
tions to spur competition, and retaining local control over banking.46
Since the states were protecting a legitimate state interest of local
banking, the Court found no equal protection violation.4V
2. The Bank Holding Company Act
The Federal Reserve Board is the major administrative unit which
creates and implements the regulations necessary to put the Bank
Holding Company Act into effect. The Board, in its regulatory func-
tion, attempts to determine Congress' intent regarding the shape of
the banking industry. Historically, the Board has seen itself as the
protector of the "public interest" and caretaker of the entire United
States financial system. Pursuing its role as protector, the Board has
aggressively attempted to create regulations which effectively control
the banking industry. However, the Board has often exceeded con-
gressional intent regarding its regulatory function, only to have the
lower courts overrule its attempts.
The case of Western Bancshares, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System4 8 serves as a prime example of the Board's
aggressive regulatory efforts. In Western, the Board attempted to
regulate the price a bank holding company paid to gain control of a
bank.49 The investing group in Western used a strategy whereby
they first purchased the controlling interest in the bank from the
majority stockholders at a high price. After the investors gained a
controlling interest, they then purchased the remaining minority in-
terests at a price two-thirds less than the price at which the majority
interests had been acquired. The Board found that this type of non-
disclosed transaction violated policy. Therefore, it denied the bank
holding company's acquisition and directed the company to divest it-
self of the bank.50
The Tenth Circuit rejected the Board's interpretation of its regula-
tory powers under the Bank Holding Company Act.51 The court
found that the Board's action did not further the needs of the com-
munity, or prevent monopolies, overcompetition, or restraint of
trade. Under the Act, these were the only standards Congress pre-
46. Id. at 2555-56.
47. Id. at 2556.
48. 480 F.2d 749 (10th Cir. 1973).
49. Id. at 751.
50. The investor bank holding company purchased 77% of the bank's shares at
$521.51 per share and 6% at $400 per share. The remaining 17% was purchased at $160-
$164 per share. Id. at 750-51. This action violated the Board's policy of extending of-
fers to "all stockholders of the same class on an equal basis." Id. at 751.
51. The Board contended that section 1842(c)(2) gave the Board broad powers to
regulate for the "public interest." Under this "public interest," the Board believed
that it had the power to regulate the acquisition prices, a position backed by the Amer-
ican Bankers Association. Id. at 752.
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scribed for the Board to apply.52 The court found that the Board had
interpreted its powers too broadly; the Act did not specifically give
the Board the power to protect minority shareholders. 53 Thus, since
the Board lacked any statutory authority, either express or implied,
the court set aside the Board's order.54
III. THE PROSPERING CONCEPT OF NONBANK BANKING
A. Financial Institutions Exploit the Bank Holding Company
Act Loophole
The Board attempted to apply these same aggressive regulatory
practices to nonbank banking. In Wilshire Oil Company of Texas v.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 55 the Board
sought to prevent Wilshire from changing a bank into a nonbank
bank. Wilshire had operated as an oil company and owned a subsidi-
ary bank,56 the Trust Company of New Jersey. Thus, Wilshire was
considered a one bank holding company subject to the Bank Holding
Company Act. In 1970, Congress amended the Act and gave such
one-bank holding companies ten years to divest their nonbanking
subsidiaries or their banking operations.57 Under the amended ver-
sion of the Act, Wilshire had to divest the oil and gas business or
cease to be a bank holding company. Instead, Wilshire attempted to
change its bank to a nonbank bank.58 The trust company operated by
taking demand deposits and making commercial loans. In order to
become a nonbank bank, Wilshire attempted to change its demand
deposits to negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts. Under
the 1970 amendments,5 9 if the trust company offered NOW accounts
to its customers, it would be considered a nonbank bank exempt
from regulation by the Board.
The trust company sent a letter to every customer reserving "the
52. Id. at 753. See also The Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982).
53. Western, 480 F.2d at 753.
54. Id. at 752, 754.
55. 668 F.2d 732 (3d Cir. 1981).
56. The Wilshire Oil Company owned 90% of the Trust Company of New Jersey.
Id. at 732-33 n.2.
57. Id. at 732-33. Originally, the Act regulated only holding companies that con-
trolled more than one bank.
58. Id. at 733. Wilshire made its attempted restructuring of the bank on Novem-
ber 20, 1980. The 10 year divestment period of the Act expired on December 31, 1980.
The change to NOW accounts seemed like a last minute effort to evade the Act. Id. at
733-34.
59. Id. at 736.
right to require 14 days notice prior to withdrawal from its transac-
tional accounts." 60 However, the letter also stated that the trust com-
pany had no intention of exercising the prior notice requirement.
The only other change the Trust made was a description change on
its forms; no other changes were made in the company's deposit or
commercial loan activities.61 The Board ordered Wilshire to divest
the banking or oil business and did not agree that the trust company
was a nonbank bank.62 Wilshire argued that this was an over-expan-
sion of the Board's regulatory power.
The court distinguished the "transactional accounts" the trust com-
pany was offering from the traditional NOW accounts. The court
found the two accounts distinguishable since the transactional ac-
counts paid no interest.63 Utilizing this difference, the court con-
cluded that this type of account was not excludable under the Act.64
Furthermore, relying on legislative history and congressional intent,
the court concluded that the trust company was to be included in
Congress' definition of a "bank" under the Act.65
Although the court held that the accounts were demand deposits,
the more important aspect of the decision involved the company's at-
tempt to evade the Act. The Board has the express regulatory power
to prevent evasions of the Act.66 The court believed this power au-
thorized the Board "to look behind the form of TCNJ's activities to
their substance .... *"67 Since Wilshire was attempting to change its
contract with its transactional accounts, the court found no harm in
allowing the Board to "penetrate the form of the contract to the un-
derlying substance of the transaction. '" 68 The Third Circuit was con-
cerned with the abuses the Act was designed to prevent, and allowed
the Board to regulate Wilshire to prevent evasion of the Act's
provisions.69
Under the Wilshire rationale, it appeared that a nonbank bank
would always be subject to regulation by the Board. In First Bancor-
60. Id. at 733-34.
61. Id. at 734. Wilshire argued that this provision prevented its customers from
having a legal right to withdraw. If there is no legal right to withdraw, the accounts
would not be demand deposits. Id. at 735.
62. Id. at 734.
63. Id. at 736-37.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 737-38. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's general counsel
also concluded that the accounts were demand deposits. Id. at 737 n.10.
66. 12 U.S.C. § 1844(b) (1982). "The board is authorized to issue such regulations
and orders as may be necessary ... and prevent evasions thereof." Id.
67. Wilshire, 668 F.2d at 739.
68. Id. at 739-40 (quoting First Nat'l Bank in Plant City v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122,
137 (1969)).
69. Wilshire, 668 F.2d at 732, 740.
[Vol. 14: 107, 1986] Nonbank Banks
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
poration v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,70 the
Board directly attacked the nonbank bank structure. The Board
sought to extend the Wilshire ruling to all NOW accounts offered by
nonbank banks. In First Bancorporation, Bancorporation applied for
and was granted approval by the Board to acquire and operate an in-
dustrial loan corporation. Two years later the industrial loan corpo-
ration began offering NOW accounts.
1. Evading the definition of "bank" in the Bank Holding
Company Act
The facts of First Bancorporation are similar to the Wilshire case.
Like Wilshire, First Bancorporation changed the company's struc-
ture to provide NOW accounts to customers. First Bancorporation,
however, is distinguishable. As an industrial loan company, First
Bancorporation was never considered a "bank" merely by changing
demand deposits to NOW accounts. Thus, in an attempt to become a
"bank," First Bancorporation tried to acquire a second industrial loan
company. The corporation planned to again offer NOW accounts
through the newly acquired loan company. The Board determined
that the second acquisition would be considered a "bank" under the
Bank Holding Company Act and, therefore, would be ineligible for
acquisition as a nonbank bank entity under "the Act."7 1 The Board
would grant the approval only if First Bancorporation did not offer
NOW accounts through the new acquisition or if the new acquisition
ceased its commercial lending. In either case, the Board insisted that
the NOW accounts of both the first and second acquisitions be subject
to reserve and interest regulations. Although First Bancorporation
never purchased the second company, the Board insisted that its new
policy announcement would no longer allow industrial loan compa-
nies to offer NOW accounts and commercial loans. Under the
Board's new policy, if both services were offered by an industrial loan
company, the loan company would be considered a "bank." The
Board officially adopted the new policy and informed First Bancorpo-
ration, as well as other companies, that a nonbank bank would be
considered a "bank."
The Tenth Circuit resoundingly rejected the Board's attempt to
regulate industrial loan companies. The court found the NOW ac-
counts were not demand deposits since Utah law required industrial
70. 728 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1984).
71. Id. at 435. See also 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982).
loan companies to "reserve the legal right to demand notice prior to
withdrawal."72 Since prior notice was reserved, thereby preventing
customers from legally demanding "immediate payment," the ac-
counts were not demand deposits. The court determined that there
were substantive differences between NOW accounts and demand de-
posits; NOW accounts, as opposed to demand accounts, can pay inter-
est, are limited to certain depositors, and cannot be subject to a legal
right of withdrawal.
Additionally, the court found that the legislative history did not
support the Board's interpretation. The court agreed that the Board
had determined, in both 1963 and 1965, that NOW accounts were sub-
ject to reserve and interest regulations. However, the court pointed
out that the Act was amended in 1966 after the Board's interpreta-
tion. The court ruled that NOW accounts offered by nonbank banks
were not subject to reserve and interest regulations under the Bank
Holding Company Act.
Finally, the court further struck down the Board's method of im-
plementing the policy. The court noted that the broad "public inter-
est" language of the Bank Holding Company Act did not allow the
Board -to make use of adjudicative orders as a "vehicle" to change
general policy. Although acknowledging the importance of reserve
and interest regulations, the court concluded that "the Board abused
its discretion by improperly attempting to propose legislative policy
by adjudicative order."73 Thus, according to the Tenth Circuit, non-
bank banks were allowed to offer both commercial loans and NOW
accounts, neither of which would be subject to regulation by the
Board.
Wilshire and First Bancorporation illustrate the development of
the nonbank bank, and the regulatory framework which nonbank
banks seek to escape. The nonbank bank emerged from the Bank
Holding Company Act's restrictions on bank financial activities. Con-
gress initially created the Bank Holding Company Act to control the
growth of banking and bank holding companies. 74 Under the Act, the
Federal Reserve Board was given the power to regulate companies
72. First Bancorporation, 728 F.2d at 436.
73. Id. at 438.
74. The Act was intended to control the banking industry and holding companies
by disallowing monopolies and creating competition. The Act was also seen as a fur-
ther extension of the policies under the Banking Act of 1933. See S. Rep. No. 1095,
84th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1956 U.S. CODE & AD. NEWS 2482, 2483; S. Rep. No.
1179, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE & AD. NEWS 2385, 2386-87.
The Act was created to "restrain the undue concentration of commercial banking re-
sources and to prevent possible abuses related to the control of commercial credit." S.
Rep. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 24, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE & AD. NEWS 5519,
5541.
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which have control over banks.75 The Board's scope of power ema-
nates from the Act's definition, including the 1966 and 1970 amend-
ments, of the word "bank."7 6
B. The Legal Mechanics of Nonbank Banking
Relevant case law clearly indicates that nonbank banks evolved
from the complex set of interwoven regulatory laws that were
adopted from 1927 to 1956. These laws were enacted in an attempt to
control and stabilize the United States financial system. From the de-
pression of the 1930's to the present day, the key legislation has at-
tempted to separate financial activities into securities underwriting,
insurance, and banking.
The First Bancorporation case illustrates that nonbanks are finan-
cial institutions that place themselves outside the regulation of the
Federal Reserve Board77 by avoiding the definition of "banks" found
in section 2(c) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.78 By
avoiding the definition of "bank," the nonbank financial institution
can offer its customers financial services that banks are not allowed
to offer.7 9 In 1970, section 2(c) was amended8 0 to include a financial
institution in the definition of a bank if the institution "1) accepts de-
posits that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand,
and 2) engages in the business of making commercial loans .... "..
Additionally, it should be noted that nonbanks fall into two distinct
categories: 1) institutions that offer demand deposits but do not make
commercial loans, and 2) institutions that make commercial loans but
do not offer demand deposits.8 2
The controversy surrounding the nonbank bank evolved through
75. The Act gives the Board the power to regulate "any company which has con-
trol over any bank ...." 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (1982).
76. The 1956 Act defined "bank" as "any national banking association or any State
bank, savings bank, or trust company .... " Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133 (1956). In
1966 Congress amended the definition to include institutions that accepted "deposits
that the depositor has a legal right to withdrawal on demand." Dimension, 106 S. Ct.
at 685.
77. See generally First Bancorporation, 728 F.2d at 434.
78. Id.
79. Dimension, 106 S. Ct. at 683.
80. 70 Stat. 133, as amended, Pub. L. 89-485 § 3, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982).
81. Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982).
82. Lobell, supra note 8, at 1196. The incentive to operate nonbank banks arises
since it allows financial institutions to offer a complete set of financial services. Depos-
iting cash, buying and selling securities, giving investment advice, and providing cash
management and trust services can simultaneously be offered by nonbank banks.
Banks, in contrast, cannot offer these services as one complete, financial package. Id.
the congressional and Federal Reserve Board definitions of "legal
right to withdraw on demand" and "commercial loans."83 Since these
words were consistently given a specific definition, the financial insti-
tutions were able to structure transactions outside the standard defi-
nitional parameters.8 4 The nonbank bank financial institutions
began to operate in nondemand deposits, obtaining funds through
federal funds and money market certificates.8 5
In response to the narrow definition of deposits, these financial in-
stitutions developed NOW accounts. 86 At first glance, the NOW ac-
count appears to operate like a checking account: a customer may
deposit funds in an account, the nonbank bank may pay interest on
such account, and the customer may negotiate withdrawals from the
account with "checks."87 However, unlike demand deposits, non-
banks banks place restrictions on the accounts by reserving the possi-
bility of prior notice before allowing withdrawal.8 8 This prior notice
provision prevents the account from coming within the definition of
"demand" deposit in section 2(c) of the Bank Holding Company
Act.89 Additionally, nonbank banks began trading in commercial in-
struments such as federal funds,90 certificates of deposit,91 commer-
83. Dimension, 106 S. Ct. at 684.
84. Id. at 686-87. These are the key words that define a bank.
85. Id. at 688-89. The specific intent of Congress' giving a narrow definition is evi-
dent in the congressional reports. A senate report explained that a bank is an "institu-
tion that accepts deposits payable on demand (checking acounts) .... S. REP. No.
1179, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1966). The report explained that the definition was
designed to determine "whether an institution is a commercial bank so as to exclude
institutions like industrial banks and nondeposit trust companies." Id.
86. NOW is the acronym for Negotiable Order of Withdrawal. Originally, NOW
accounts were developed in the northeastern states. Congressional action through the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1464(c), 1832(a), 3501-03 (1982), allowed NOW accounts to be offered through all de-
pository financial institutions. See K. COOPER & D. FRASER, supra note 12, at 105-25.
87. See generally infra notes 112-17. In First Bancorporation v. Board of Gover-
nors of Fed. Reserve, 728 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1984), the Board attempted to classify
NOW accounts as checking accounts. The Tenth Circuit rejected the Board's broad in-
terpretation. Id.
88. See K. COOPER & D. FRASER, supra note 12, at 105-25.
89. Dimension, 106 S. Ct. at 686.
90. Federal funds are "commercial bank excess reserves ... ordinarily held in the
Federal Reserve Banks, which are borrowed and lent in a very short-term market." L.
AUERNHEIMER & R. EKELUND, JR., supra note 1, at 284. The federal funds market rep-
resents the trading that occurs between banks with their excess reserves. Banks that
are members of the Federal Reserve System are required to hold a certain percentage
of their assets as reserves in the Federal Reserve Banks. These are the emergency
reserves of the banks. The banks lend their excess reserves (federal funds) to banks
that need more reserves. The excess reserve banks charge interest and earn income
on their idle funds. Banks in need of funds can meet their reserve requirements with
the federal funds they have borrowed overnight. This lending of federal funds in-
creases the earnings of banks with excess funds and allows the banks with shortages to
take remedial measures (such as liquidating assets to increase their reserves) to meet
the Federal Reserve requirements. Small banks consistently have the excess funds to
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cial paper,9 2 and bankers' acceptances;9 3 these are not traditionally
considered commercial loans.
Since state nonbank banks could use various sources of funds and
profits without coming under the definition of "commercial loan" in
the Bank Holding Company Act, a careful structuring of its financial
operations would allow a nonbank to avoid federal regulations. From
the inception of the Bank Holding Company Act in 1956 until 1984,
the Federal Reserve Board remained consistent in its interpretation
of the definition of "demand deposit" and "commercial loan."9 4 How-
ever, in 1984, through an amendment to "Regulation Y," the Board
attempted to bring nonbank banks under its regulations.9 5 The
supply to the larger commercial banks. E. KANE, THE GATHERING CRISIS IN FEDERAL
DEPOSIT INSURANCE 95 (1985).
91. Certificates of deposits are negotiable certificates which pay interest rates as a
function of the length and size of the certificate as well as the reputation of the issuing
bank. Certificates, in general, are an effort to attract more corporate deposits. The
certificate itself represents a receipt for the time deposit at the bank. R. JOHNSON &
R. MELICHER, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 161 (5th ed. 1982).
92. Commercial paper is a short term debt instrument of large corporations which
are held by banks. These debt instruments are highly liquid and are often held as sec-
ondary reserves by banks. The corporations sell these notes to financial institutions to
obtain short term working capital. L. AUERNHEIMER & R. EKELUND, JR., supra note 1,
at 285.
93. Bankers' acceptances are similar to commercial paper. They are short term
notes issued by businesses to the banks for funding. The bank "accepts" the note
which acts as a guarantee of the note. The business agrees to pay the holder a fixed
amount at the maturity date on the note. If the business defaults on the payment, the
bank that has "accepted" the note must pay the holder in full. Id.
94. The NOW account did not become a major deposit form until the late 1970's.
The Federal Depository and Institutions Act of 1980 made NOW accounts an official
form of savings account. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Con-
trol Act of 1980, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(c), 1832(a), 3501-03 (1982); see also supra note 86.
The Board advised Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. that purchasing "'money market
instruments' such as certificates of deposit, commercial paper & bank acceptances"
were not commercial loans under the Act. Letter from Michael A. Greenspan, Assis-
tant Secretary, Board of Governors to Lee J. Aubrey, Vice President, Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston at 2 (May 18, 1972), cited in Dimension, 106 S. Ct. at 687.
In 1974, the Board recognized that savings and loans which participated in federal
funds and issued certificates of deposits were not "banks" under the Act. American
Fletcher Corp., 60 Fed. Res. Bull. 868, 869 n.8 (1974). In 1977, the Board concluded that
Congress should decide which institutions should be "banks" or "nonbanks." D.H.
Baldwin Co., 63 Fed. Res. Bull. 280 (1977). Call loans to brokers were not considered
commercial loans. Letter from Baldwin P. Tuttle, Deputy General Counsel to the
Board to Michael A. Greenspan at 2-3 (Jan. 16, 1976). Even as late as 1981 the internal
memorandum of the Federal Reserve System excluded federal funds and money mar-
ket instruments from the definition of commercial loans. Federal Reserve System, Of-
fice Correspondence (Feb. 10, 1981). Dimension, 106 S. Ct. at 687.
95. The Board feared the acquisition of nonbank banks by large corporate insur-
ance, security, and commercial organizations. Dimension, 106 S. Ct. at 685 n.3. The
Board believed nonbank banks were dangerous to the national banking system in
terms "demand deposit" and "commercial loan" were redefined by
the Board so as to gain regulatory control over nonbank banks.96
The Board expanded its definitions under Regulation Y to include
NOW accounts, federal funds, and money market certificates. The
amendment defined "demand deposit" as a deposit which is "as a
matter of practice payable on demand." 97 This definition places NOW
accounts and nonbank banks offering such accounts under the
Board's control.98 In addition, the Board amended its definition of
"commercial loan"99 to include "the purchase of retail installment
loans or commercial paper, certificates of deposit, bankers' accept-
ances and similar money market instruments.' 10 0 While traditionally
these items had not been considered commercial loans, the defini-
tional change sought to reverse the prior stance. 101 The amended
Regulation Y closed both loopholes where nonbank banks operated
in order to give the Board regulatory control over nonbank banks.102
Congress was well aware of the changes occurring in the financial
markets and elected not to expand the scope of the Bank Holding
Company Act.103 However, the Board believed that the new defini-
tions were necessary to carry out the Act's basic purposes of insuring
an impartial credit system, preventing conflicts of interest, and avoid-
three respects. First, by avoiding federal regulations, nonbank banks had a competi-
tive advantage over banks. Second, nonbanks were allowing banking operations to be-
come closer to commercial operations. Third, the interstate banking laws were being
circumvented by the interstate acquisitions of nonbank banks. See Regulation Y, 49
Fed. Reg. 794, 835-36 (1984).
96. Dimension, 106 S. Ct. at 685.
97. 49 Fed. Reg. 794, 835-36 (1984).
98. Dimension, 106 S. Ct. at 685. Most depository institutions seldom exercise
their absolute right to require prior notice of withdrawal. The literal interpretation of
"demand deposit" in the Bank Holding Company Act includes a "legal right" to with-
draw on demand. This amended definition attempted to close this loophole.
99. 49 Fed. Reg. 794, 835-36 (1984).
100. The amended version of Regulation Y was first proposed in 1983. 48 Fed. Reg.
23,520 (1983) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225) (proposed May 25, 1983). The summary of
the proposal explains the changes as an attempt to simplify and reduce the applica-
tions for nonbanking activities. The section which changes the definitions of "demand
deposit" and "commercial loan" reads in pertinent part:
(A) "Demand deposits" means any deposit with transactional capability that,
as a matter of practice is payable on demand, and that is withdrawable by
check, draft, negotiable order of withdrawal, or other similar instrument;
(B) "Commercial loans" means any loan other than a loan to an individual
for personal, family, household, or charitable purposes, and includes the
purchase of retail instrument loans or commercial paper, certificates of de-
posit, bankers acceptances, and similar money market instruments, the exten-
sion of broker call loans, the sale of federal funds, and the deposit of interest-
bearing funds....
12 C.F.R. § 225.2 (1986).
101. See Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(2)(c) (1982).
102. See generally supra note 97.
103. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, 12
U.S.C. §§ 1464(c), 1832(a), 3501-03 (1982).
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ing the concentration of control.104 The Board realized that nonbank
banks were becoming the "functional" equivalent of banks without
regulatory control. Since the Act gave the Board the regulatory
power to implement regulations, controlling nonbank banks seemed
to be a logical regulatory extension. 0 5
1. The Dimension decision legitimizes nonbank banking
In Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. Dimension
Financial Corporation,1O6 the United States Supreme Court resolved
the issue of amended Regulation Y's effect on nonbank banking.O?
The Dimension Corporation unveiled plans to acquire thirty-one na-
tional banks in twenty-five states. The banks would operate as non-
bank banks by taking demand deposits and not making commercial
loans.10S Under this umbrella of control, the Dimension Financial
Corporation would effectively become an interstate nonbanking sys-
tem.10 9 The Federal Reserve Board would be powerless to regulate
the thirty-one nonbank banks since they would not be "banks" under
the Bank Holding Company Act.
The Federal Reserve Board rejected the Dimension Financial Cor-
poration's applications.110 Under the amended form of Regulation
Y,111 the Board determined that the Dimension applications were not
nonbank banks but were instead banks. Since the amended regula-
tion defines "demand deposit" as a deposit that is "as a matter of
practice payable on demand," the deposits of the Dimension non-
banks would be deemed deposits under section 2 of the Bank Holding
Company Act.112 The corporation also intended to engage in money
market transactions which, under the amended regulation, would be
104. 49 Fed. Reg. at 841.
105. See generally supra note 94.
106. 106 S. Ct. 681 (1986).
107. Plans for 31 "Nonbank Banks" Unveiled by Investor Group, 40 Wash. Fin.
Rep. (BNA) 407 (Feb. 28, 1983). See Lobell, supra note 8, at 1210-11.
108. If a bank attempted the same type of corporate structure, it would run afoul of
the purposes of the Bank Holding Company Act. See supra note 38. In addition, a
bank would have to gain approval to bypass the McFadden Act and the Douglas
Amendment.
109. See generally Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (1982).
110. Dimension first appealed to the United States Court of Appeals. See Dimen-
sion Fin. Corp. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve System, 744 F.2d 1402 (10th Cir.
1984) (the Tenth Circuit rejected the Federal Reserve Board's attempt to control non-
bank banks through amended Regulation Y).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 16-27 & notes 38-44.
112. The banks which Dimension was seeking to acquire were only offering NOW
accounts to their customers.
considered commercial loans. Thus, under amended Regulation Y,
Dimension's transactions would meet both criteria of section 2(c) of
the Bank Holding Company Act.113 The ultimate result would be a
classification of the corporation's acquisitions as banks, a determina-
tion which would subject Dimension to the Board's regulation. 114
In Dimension, the United States Supreme Court rejected the
Board's attempt to regulate nonbank banks by amending Regulation
y.115 The Court's rationale rested on the legislative intent behind
the Bank Holding Company Act,ll6 the abrupt change in the Board's
policy, 1' 7 and the plain purpose of the Act.11s The Court noted that
Congress had changed the definition of "bank" in section 2(c) of the
Act twice in recent years but never intended to include nonbank
banks in the definition.119 In addition, the Court also soundly re-
jected the Board's new definition of "demand deposit" and "commer-
cial loan."120 Finally, since Dimension's applications were not to be
considered "banks," the Court determined that the Board was power-
less to regulate the proposed nonbank banks.
The Court explained that the Act gave the Board broad powers
"over bank holding companies 'to restrain the undue concentration of
commercial banking resources and to prevent possible abuses related
to the control of commercial credit." '121 Under the Act, nonbank
banks were neither banks nor bank holding companies, and there-
fore, they were not subject to regulation by the Board.122 The Court
also rejected the Board's contentions that the legislation was in-
tended to regulate institutions that were "functionally equivalent" to
banks. While the Court admitted that "there is much to be said for
regulating financial institutions that are the functional equivalent of
113. Dimension, 106 S. Ct. at 683-84.
114. Id. at 687.
115. Id. at 684. The Board's attempt to reclassify NOW accounts as demand depos-
its was rejected by the Tenth Circuit in First Bancorporation v. Board of Governors,
728 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1984) (Utah law prevents industrial loan companies from ac-
cepting demand deposits; NOW accounts are not demand deposits under section 2(c) of
the Bank Holding Company Act).
116. Dimension, 106 S. Ct. at 683-88.
117. The Board's policy could not overturn the congressional intent. Id. at 689.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 685. See also First Bancorporation, 728 F.2d at 436-37.
120. Dimension, 106 S. Ct. at 686-87. The Board was attempting to regulate "com-
mercial loan substitutes." Thus, credit extensions through nonconventional methods
would be deemed "commercial loans." Id. at 686. The Court found that "[tihe term
'commercial loan' is used in the financial community to describe the direct loan from a
bank to a business customer for the purpose of providing funds needed by the cus-
tomer in its business." Id. (emphasis added). Characteristic of such a loan is a close
borrower-lender relationship. Id.
121. Id. at 684 (quoting S. REP. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 24, reprinted in 1970
U.S. CODE & AD. NEWS 5519, 5541).
122. Dimension, 106 S. Ct. at 684-85.
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banks,"123 it explained that this problem must be resolved by Con-
gress, and not the courts.
Congress defined with specificity certain transactions that constitute banking
subject to regulation. The statute may be imperfect, but the Board has no
power to correct flaws that it perceives in the statute it is empowered to ad-
minister. Its rulemaking power is limited to adopting regulations to carry into
effect the will of Congress as expressed in the statute. If the Bank Holding
Company Act falls short of providing safeguards desirable or necessary to pro-
tect the public interest, that is a problem for Congress, and not the Board or
the courts, to address.
1 2 4
The message of the Court was simple: if regulatory changes were to
be made, Congress would have to make the changes by amending the
statute.
IV. THE IMPACT OF NONBANK BANKING
As a result of the Dimension decision, nonbank banking is certain
to proliferate. Congress must now address the impact that nonbank
banks will have on the financial sector. The Dimension decision
thrusts upon Congress concerns regarding the effect of nonbanks on
established commercial banks, the safety of the financial system, the
role of the Federal Reserve, and monetary policy. In the future, it
must be decided what long range benefits nonbank banks will pro-
vide for the average American and the overall economy. Congress
must then draft legislation to allow the financial system to provide
both safety and financial innovations.
A. The Effect of Nonbank Banks Upon Established
Commercial Banks
From 1978 to 1982, the financial system of the United States suf-
fered from slow growth and high interest rates.125 For banks, the pe-
riod represented a time for introspection and reevaluation into the
future direction of banking: banks were burdened with outstanding
loans that yielded low income through low interest rates. Simultane-
ously, the banks were faced with paying a high rate of interest to at-
123. Id. at 688. Congress could have easily amended the Act to use the "functional
equivalency" test.
124. Id. at 689.
125. Comprehensive Reform in The Financial Services Industry: Hearings Before
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 123
(1985) (testimony of Paul Volcker, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Hearings]. Most of the problems resulted from financial institutions loan-
ing out funds based on projections of inflation. During this period of disinflation, the
banks were strained by their inaccurate economic forecasts. For a list of bank failures
of 1984 and the first half of 1985, see id. at 179-89.
tract deposits.126 The result was often slow growth and a low return
on the bank's investments. 127 By contrast, nonbank banks were
growing rapidly and expanding while banks were experiencing slow
growth. During this period, nonbanks expanded in all areas. 128
Overall comparisons of nonbank banks with commercial banks
have been compiled and statistically analyzed by the Federal Reserve
System.129 The statistics show that nonbank banks grew at a rate
comparable to commercial banks in both market percentage and
profitability. 130 The Federal Reserve Board classifies nonbanks as re-
tailers,'31 industrial based companies,132 diversified financial firms,133
126. Id. at 158 (Chairman Volcker's written answers to the committee's written
questions concerning the asset quality problems).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. The Federal Reserve Board of Chicago's research department has consist-
ently produced statistical compilations of banks and nonbanks. The compilations com-
pare the two groups of financial institutions using data prepared by the Federal
Reserve System. See Pavel & Rosenblum, Banks and Nonbanks: The Horse Race Con-
tinues, ECON. PERSP., May-June 1985, at 3 (an analysis of 1981, 1983, and some 1984
statistics on banks and nonbanks) [hereinafter cited as The Horse Race]. The authors
indicate that banks are showing "an amazing degree of resiliency" in the changing
marketplace. Id. at 15; see also Rosenblum, Siegel & Pavel, Banks and Nonbanks: A
Run for the Money, ECON. PERSP. May-June 1983, at 2 (reprint) (the article presents an
analysis of bank and nonbank statistics from 1972 and 1981 and contains a table sum-
mary of change concerning banks and nonbanks from 1980 to 1982 in chronological or-
der) [hereinafter cited as A Run for the Money]; Di Clemente, What is a Bank?, ECON.
PERSP., Jan.-Feb. 1983, at 20, 24-26 (an analysis of the Federal Reserve Board's chang-
ing views on the definition of bank under the Bank Holding Company Act. The article
presents a concise view of the Board's changing definition in table form). Pavel & Ro-
senblum, Financial Darwinism: Nonbanks-and Banks-are Surviving (SM-85-5) (Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Chicago Staff Memoranda) (extensive in-depth analysis of
nonbank and bank statistical information); Kaufman, Mote & Rosenblum, Conse-
quences of Deregulation for Commercial Banking (SM-84-3) (Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago Staff Memoranda) (an analysis of the effect of deregulation, including its ef-
fect on banks and nonbanks). Sears Corporation has published a series of white papers
on nonbank banking. See generally Foreman, Financial Services for All (n.d.) (ex-
plains the development of the nonbank bank); Greenspan, Risk, Safety and Bank De-
regulation (n.d.) (encourages deregulation of banking with some capital control on
large banks); Janklow, Competition and Consumer Needs (n.d.) (an overview of der-
egulated banking written by the Governor of South Dakota); Morton, Financial Serv-
ices Deregulation: A Necessity for the Insurance Industry (n.d.) (supports continued
deregulation of the financial sector as viewed by the President of John Hancock Insur-
ance Co.); Wriston, Insights, Consequences and Competition (n.d.) (general overview of
deregulation and the ability of electronic banking to transcend the state border lines).
130. See The Horse Race, supra note 129, at 4-5.
131. Retailer nonbank banks include Sears, J.C. Penney and Montgomery Ward.
Id. at 5.
132. Industrial nonbank banks include the following: General Motors Acceptance
Corp., Ford Motor Credit Co., Chrysler Financial Corp., IBM Credit Corp., General
Electric Credit, Westinghouse Credit, Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp., Gulf & Western,
Control Data, Greyhound, Dana Corp., Armco Corp., National Intergroup, and ITT
Corp. Id.
.133. There are eight diversified financials: American Express, Merrill Lynch, E.F.
Hutton, Household International, Beneficial Corp., Avco Corp., Loews Corp., and
Transamerica. Id.
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and insurance-based companies. 3 4 Each of these groups experienced
growth during the 1978-83 period.135 Although the data was limited
and restrictive, it showed a clear trend: nonbank banks grew but
their growth was cyclical in nature. When the economy was bad for
commercial banks, nonbank banks grew. As the economy improved,
however, commercial banks seemed to "catch up" with the nonbank
banks.136
The question is how long can commercial banks play "catch up"
with the nonbanks? Since nonbanks are not subject to reserve re-
quirements and other regulations by the Federal Reserve, they can
utilize all of their excess cash to increase their return on equity. This
ability to earn higher rates of return encourages the growth of non-
banks; increased profitability will attract more investors who are
willing to develop more nonbanks.
Commercial banks and other financial institutions threatened by
nonbank banks should look to state legislatures, not Congress, to im-
prove market conditions since the states hold one of the key pivotal
regulatory powers for decreasing the threat of nonbank banks:137 the
134. The insurance company nonbank banks include the following: Prudential, Eq-
uitable Life Assurance, Aetna Life & Casualty, American General Corp. and The
Travelers. Id.
135. Id. With this increase in growth came an increase in profits as well. The
thirty top nonbank banks earned $8 billion in profits in 1983. Id.
136. Although the banks have suffered somewhat in terms of profitability, they
have "fared quite well against their nonbank competitors in the competitive environ-
ment of deregulation." Id. at 15.
137. Douglas Amendment, 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982). The technological change of
electronic banking allowed banks to set up remote banking facilities. The ability to set
up facilities at alternative sites, beyond a bank's "brick and mortar" main office,
caused competitive turmoil between state and national banks at the state level.
Branch banking inside a state's borders is defined by the McFadden Act. 12 U.S.C.
§ 36, ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224 (1927) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1982)). See Securi-
ties Indus. v. Comptroller of the Currency, 765 F.2d 1196 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (upholding
the district court's finding that discount brokerage houses operated by banks are
branch offices) cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 790 (1986); Independent Bankers Ass'n v.
Marine Midland Bank, 757 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1985) (definition of branch bank under the
McFadden Act does not include a national bank's shared use of an automatic teller
machine (ATM) so long as the national bank does not own or rent the ATM); Ameri-
can Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. v. Heimann, 683 F.2d 999 (6th Cir. 1982) (the state
banking supervisor's interpretation of "branch" within the meaning of that state's
branching statute is not binding on the comptroller of the currency in the evaluation
of national bank branch applications); Mutschler v. Peoples Nat'l Bank of Wash., 607
F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1979) (the comptroller does not have a plenary power to define
branch bank without regard to state law); State Bank of Fargo v. Merchants Nat'l
Bank & Trust, 593 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1979) (where state banks, savings and loans and
credit unions are using ATM's, the comptroller may approve ATM "branches" for na-
tional banks); Dakota Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 554 F.2d 345 (8th
states can affect the growth of nonbank banking by utilizing the
Douglas Amendment138 to increase interstate banking.
One of the reasons that nonbank banking has grown so rapidly is
its ability to operate nationwide by avoiding the interstate regulatory
restrictions on banks and bank holding companies.139 Technological
change transcended states' borders and made nationwide instantane-
ous banking a reality. States, however, have continually attempted to
prevent the development of interstate banking.140 By not allowing
banks to grow with technological change, states have encouraged fi-
nancial innovators to seek alternatives and substitutes to strictly reg-
ulated banking.141
To date, twenty-one states have enacted legislation to provide for
some type of interstate banking.142 There are four categories of inter-
state banking legislation: regional/reciprocal,4 3 national/recipro-
Cir. 1977) (a detached facility offering only limited banking services is a "branch"
under the McFadden Act regardless of the comptroller certifying the facility as an "ex-
tension"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977); St. Louis City Nat'l Bank v. Mercantile
Trust Co. Nat'l Ass'n, 548 F.2d 716 (8th Cir. 1976) (the general definition of branch in-
cludes a facility that receives deposits, pays checks, lends money or transacts business
carried on at the main office) cert. denied, 433 U.S. 909 (1977); Independent Bankers
Ass'n of Am. v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (customer bank communication
terminals (CBCT's) are "branches" under the McFadden Act) cert. denied, 429 U.S.
862 (1976); Nebraskans for Indep. Banking, Inc. v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 530 F.2d 755
(8th Cir. 1976) (detached facility was "branch" and not an "extension") cert. granted,
426 U.S. 310 (1976); vacated, 426 U.S. 310 (1976).
138. The amendment first incorporates the federal structure and then incorporates
the state legislation.
139. See supra notes 75-95 and accompanying text.
140. Id.
141. See infra note 165.
142. Hearings, supra note 125, at 93-98.
143. The regional/reciprocal interstate banking states and their respective statutes
include the following: Connecticut: See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-552 (West Supp.
1985) (defines the regional "New England" banks); id. § 36-553 (allows interstate bank
holding company acquisitions); see id. § 36-554 (allows interstate bank acquisitions);
Florida: see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 658.295 (West Supp. 1986); Georgia: see GA. CODE ANN.
§ 7-1-620(10)(11) (Supp. 1985) (defines the "Southern Regional" banks); id. § 7-1-621
(allows the regional interstate acquisitions); Idaho: see IDAHO CODE § 26-2602 (Supp.
1985) (defines the purpose of the interstate acquisition section); id. § 26-2605(b)(i) (de-
fines the regional area of states); id. § 26-2605(c) (requires reciprocity); Indiana: see
IND. CODE ANN. § 28-2-15-15 (Burns Supp. 1986) (defines "regional bank"); id. § 28-2-
15-17 (grants the interstate acquisition rights); id. 28-2-15-17(e)(1),(2) (describes the
reciprocity requirements); Maryland: see MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 5-903 (Supp.
1985) (allows interstate acquisitions; defines reciprocity requirements); Massachusetts:
see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 167A, § 2 (West Supp. 1986); North Carolina: see N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 53-210(12) (Supp. 1985) (defines "Regional" Bank); id. § 53-211(a) (allows
interstate acquisitions); id. § 53-211(a)(2) (defines the reciprocity requirements); Ore-
gon: see OR. REV. STAT. § 715.065 (Supp. 1985) (allows interstate acquisitions); id.
§ 715.070 (places limitations on acquiring out-of-state companies); South Carolina: see
S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-24-20(12) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984) (defines "Southern Region
States"); id. § 34-24-50(b)(2) (requires reciprocity); Tennessee: see TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 45-12-102(12) (Supp. 1985) (defines "regional" bank); id. § 45-12-103 (allows inter-
state acquisitions); id. § 45-12-103(2) (requires reciprocity); Utah: see UTAH CODE ANN.
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cal,144 pure national,145 and trigger statutes. 146 Each of these
categories have one common attribute: they operate through the
Douglas Amendment and allow banks to operate, own or branch into
states other than the bank's principal place of business. The statutes
differ only by the degree to which they allow interstate banking.
Some statutes are drafted to allow unrestricted interstate banking
while others are drafted narrowly to allow interstate banking only in
specific instances. 147 These statutes are one of the best weapons
against the spread of nonbank banking. By removing the restrictions
on banking, the statutes remove some of the incentives to create non-
bank banks.148
The new concept of true interstate banking heralds the concerns
and problems associated with the concentration of banking.149 Thus,
§ 7-1-102 (1983) (expresses the intent of the legislation); id. § 7-1-103 (defines the "re-
ciprocal" states); id. § 7-1-702 (allows acquisitions between the "reciprocal" states); Vir-
ginia: see VA. CODE § 6.1-194.97 (Supp. 1985) (allows interstate acquisitions between the
regional states); id. § 6.1-194.97(1) (requires reciprocity).
144. There is only one national/reciprocal interstate banking state - New York;
see N.Y. BANKING LAW § 142-b, §9 (a)(i), (ii) (McKinney Supp. 1986) (this section
which is conditioned on reciprocity, allows for in-state acquisitions by out-of-state
banks).
145. The pure national interstate banking states include the following: Alaska; Ari-
zona (see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-324 (Supp. 1985)); Maine (see ME. REV. STAT.
ANN., tit. 9-B, § 1013 (Supp. 1985)); South Dakota (see S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 51-
16-40 (Supp. 1985)(provides for the acquisition of in-state bank holding companies by
out-of-state holding companies); id. § 51-16-41 (limits the acquiring bank holding com-
pany to one bank office)); Washington (see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 30.04, 230(2)
(Supp. 1986) (allows for the acquisitions of in-state banks by out-of-state banks)).
146. There are two states with trigger statutes: Kentucky: see Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 287.900 (Supp. 1984) (subsection (a) defines "bank"; subsection (d)(6)(a) refers to the
regional requirements limiting acquisitions to contiguous states; and section (d)(6)(b) is
the trigger section of the statute); and Rhode Island: see R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-30-2
(Supp. 1985) (authorizing interstate bank acquisitions); id. § 19-30-4 (authorizing inter-
state mutual bank acquisitions).
147. The most specific requirement is that of reciprocity. However, those states
with regional statutes allow only banks within a certain region to operate in their par-
ticular state.
148. From the current statistical evidence of the Federal Reserve Board, the trend
is that "banks will improve their chances of competing successfully against their non-
bank competitors as geographic and product restrictions are relaxed." See The Horse
Race, supra note 129, at 16. The Federal Reserve Board recognized that by regulating
banks too closely, the banks will "respond to market demands and competitive pres-
sures by developing and exploiting loopholes in the law." Hearings, supra note 125, at
150 (written testimony of Paul Volcker, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board).
149. Hearings, supra note 125, at 177 (testimony of William M. Isaac, Chairman of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)). The FDIC favors the view of lim-
iting the concentration of banking by amending the antitrust laws. The FDIC does not
favor the merging of large financial institutions. Since the FDIC is concerned with the
insurance of the financial system, the risk of loss is less if there are a greater number
there must be a balancing between the interstate character of bank-
ing and allowing larger banks to obtain a larger market share (con-
centration). The interstate statutes which fall into the categories of
regional/reciprocal, national/reciprocal, and trigger statutes all at-
tempt to limit concentration.150 These categories limit interstate
banking or concentration in three ways: 1) by defining a specific geo-
graphical area, and allowing states in that area to conduct interstate
banking; 2) by imposing a time limit; or 3) by invoking a trigger stat-
ute. Although these elaborate statutory schemes are in place, effects
of concentration on the United States financial system are un-
known.1 5 1 Even the Federal Reserve System has published studies
which are contradictory in predicting the effects of concentrated
banking.152
B. The Safety of the Financial System
Congress and state legislatures must also be concerned with the ef-
fect of nonbank banking on the safety of the United States financial
system. Again, nonbanks exist because bypassing the federal insur-
ance reserve requirements allows nonbanks to earn higher profit
margins. When a bank obtains a deposit from a customer, only a
fraction of that deposit can be lent out by the bank.153 The bank
must retain portions of the deposit for federal reserve require-
ments 5 4 and federal deposit insurance reserves. Nonbanks are not
subject to the reserve requirements and, thus, can utilize all of their
funds to increase profits. Policy makers must carefully analyze the
effect that bypassing reserves will have on the security and insurance
portions of the United States financial system.155 Although the legal
of financial institutions. Concentration of the largest financial systems is detrimental
to the financial insurance system. Id. The chairman would prefer legislation to a "flat
out ban" on the largest institutions from making acquisitions "of any significant size."
Id. at 198.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. The Federal Reserve Board presented evidence to the Senate that concentra-
tion would not be severe. "'Market concentration' is a quantitative term that meas-
ures how much of a defined product and geographic market specified firms 'control'
before and after a merger." DeVolder, supra note 8, at 924 n.172.
As an analytical tool, the Federal Reserve Board compared the effects of interstate
banking statutes on two of the largest states, California and New York. This data
showed small banks effectively competing with large banks in a true interstate envi-
ronment. But see Baer & Mote, The Effects of Nationwide Banking on Concentration:
Evidence From Abroad, ECON. PERSP. Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 3. In this report, the Federal
Reserve Board compared the effects of concentration by using the European countries
as a model. The result was that high amounts of concentration are likely to occur
under pure interstate banking in the United States. The testimony and report repre-
sent two contradictory views within the Federal Reserve itself.
153. See generally L. AUERNHEIMER & R. EKELUND, JR., supra note 1.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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framework for nonbanking should be nonregulatory in nature, the
public at large must not bear the burden of failed nonbank banks and
banks alone. The changes occurring in the financial market demand
a careful balancing of financial safety and freedom of financial
innovation.
During 1978 to 1986, the United States financial system suffered
tremendous losses through bank failures.156 These failures occurred
despite the entangled web of federal and state regulatory "protec-
tions." Yet, such losses often go unnoticed since the public is buf-
fered from the adverse effects by federal insurance.157 The effect
nonbanking will have on this "safety net" of financial insurance is
still uncertain.
In congressional hearings, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board and the head of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ex-
pressed the opinion that nonbank banks are detrimental to the over-
all safety of the United States financial system.158 The concerns
expressed centered around the uncertainty that nonbank banks cre-
ate and the possibilities for abuse which exist in a nonuniform regu-
latory system.159 However, the only example of abuse cited was that
suffered by the Ohio banking system.160 In fact, testimony indicated
that it was the federal banking regulations, catalyzed by unsound
156. Hearings, supra note 125, at 161-62, 179-89.
157. Id. at 190. Chairman Volcker feared the "gaping loophole" of nonbanks. The
Chairman was also concerned that nonbanks are "bit[ing] off pieces of the banking
business." The Chairman believed that by letting nonbank banks exist, the result was
a "weakening [of] the fabric of banking." Id. (testimony of the Chairman of the Fed-
eral Reserve Board). The FDIC would propose legislation that would define a bank as
any institution "that calls itself a bank and takes deposits from the public .... Id. at
192. The concerns of the FDIC chairman are that nonbank banks may hold them-
selves out as banks and fail. If the deposits were uninsured, the public would lose
their life savings. Id. But see id. at 191 (Chairman Issac of the FDIC testifies that non-
banks have been allowed to be insured since 1969).
158. The possible abuses of nonbank banking occur because the public usually be-
lieves that the nonbank bank is a bank and subject to all of the safeguards of federal
insurance. This is the concern of uncertainty. Financial institutions in Ohio, Tennes-
see, Nebraska and Iowa had operated as "banks." In reality they were not banks.
When they failed, they took the life savings of many people.
Ohio's problem was unique since the Ohio banks operated on a state based banking
insurance. The state system could not repay all the losses sustained by the banks;
thus, the savers lost their money. Such uninsured failures damage the public's confi-
dence in the banking system. Id. at 167. Since a bank can be composed under a vari-
ety of forms, (insured and noninsured) this lack of uniformity misleads the public.
Large banks are also subject to failure. Continental Illinois almost failed but was re-
structured without the use of FDIC funds. Id. at 166.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 167.
banking management, which contributed to the failure of many
banks during 1984-85.161 Indeed, the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration has recently taken steps to reduce the reserve requirements
for agricultural banks to allow the banks a better chance to survive
the agricultural crisis. This action enforces the view that the federal
regulators are somewhat to blame for bank failures.
While the federal regulators address the problems created by the
lack of uniformity in the financial system, they fail to address the
beneficial economic effects of nonbank banking. For example, some
of the largest nondepository nonbank growth has occurred in captive
finance nonbanks like the General Motors Acceptance Corporation.
By cutting out the middleman banker, the automobile manufacturers
are able to offer the public lower financing at times when banks are
not interested in loaning funds for autos.162 This intermediary role
creates a beneficial effect for the economy as a whole and allows peo-
ple to purchase autos they otherwise could not obtain. Similarly,
why should a person be forced to go to a separate real estate agent,
insurance agent, and stock broker, if he can make all of the transac-
tions through a retail financial network? The questions of consumer
choice and consumer convenience overlap the question of safety.
These safety and consumer issues cannot be isolated without examin-
ing the entire effect of nonbanking on the United States economy.
C The Role of the Federal Reserve and Monetary Policy
The impact of nonbank banking must include an analysis of its ef-
fect on the federal regulators themselves.163 Most notably, what ef-
fect, if any, has the development of nonbank banking had on the
Federal Reserve, and its ability to carry out monetary policy? For
the Federal Reserve, the growth of nonbank banks has been a set-
back in its ability to dominate and control the United States financial
system and economy. 164 As case law has demonstrated, the courts do
not see the Federal Reserve as having any power to regulate non-
bank banks by changing the definition of Regulation Y to bring the
nonbanks under the Bank Holding Company Act's provisions. 165 If
the Federal Reserve Board cannot bring nonbank banks under the
Bank Holding Company Act, then the Federal Reserve Board cannot
regulate nonbank banks. As the Wilshire case illustrates, the only
161. Id. at 166.
162. The regulators in the federal government are the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
163. See supra note 8.
164. Id.
165. See U.S. Trust Corp. v. Board of Governors of The Fed. Reserve System, 106 S.
Ct. 875 (1986) (the Eleventh Circuit's decision was vacated and remanded to be consis-
tent with the Dimension decision).
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time the Board may act is when a nonbank is attempting to evade the
Bank Holding Company Act.166
A more important question is whether nonbanks have affected the
Federal Reserve Board's ability to carry out effective monetary pol-
icy.167 Have the nonbank banks limited the Board's ability to use the
discount rate, reserve requirements, and open market operations?
Currently the Federal Reserve System has not implemented any
study to determine if nonbank banks have affected its monetary pol-
icy in any way.168 The following scenario, however, illustrates how
the monetary policy may be effected.
If nonbank banks provide credit that follows a path bypassing
banks entirely, then the Board's monetary control may be hampered.
For instance, if the Board attempts to reduce inflation, it will often
increase the discount rate.16 9 This attempt to slow inflation will usu-
ally not show results for approximately four months and may affect
the economy for several years.170 The Board monitors its monetary
policies by examining the effects of its actions on the artificial statis-
166. The courts have never overturned the Federal Reserve's power to prevent eva-
sions of the Bank Holding Company Act.
167. Monetary Policy - This is where law and economic theories necessarily mesh.
It is critical that the policy makers carefully draft competent legislation in this area to
prevent unexpected economic consequences.
168. There is the possibility that funds may temporarily avoid the banking system
and therefore affect the Federal Reserve Board's ability to accurately measure the sta-
tistical indices. For example, if the Federal Reserve buys government bonds from a
bank, the bank will take a fraction of the proceeds and make a loan. That loan money
may then be taken and used to buy commercial paper from a nonbank bank. In this
way the banking system is bypassed. Yet, the seller of the commercial paper will prob-
ably deposit the funds from the commercial paper sale into a bank. Thus, the funds
have returned to the banking system. Telephone interview with Christine Pavel, Asso-
ciate Economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (Apr. 3, 1986). But see infra
note 170.
169. See supra notes 8-13.
170. The lagged effect has been interpreted in a variety of ways by economists. If
the Federal Reserve alters bank reserves by buying securities, then the full effect of
the economy may be felt in four months. But the effect on real output and inflation
may not be felt for one to ten years in the future with the actual effect lasting for sev-
eral years. Since the exact effect of the Federal Reserve's actions cannot be measured,
economists disagree on the actual lag effect time spans. Yet, all economists agree on
one point: the Federal Reserve Board has the "power, clout, and tools to change the
economy." Telephone interview with Tom Gittings, Senior Economist at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago (April 3, 1986). If the Board wants to slow the economy, it
can do so by using a strict monetary policy.
The most recent example of an exercise of this power occurred in 1979. At that
time, the inflation rate in the United States was 12% annually, and the Board wanted
to slow down the economy by reducing the rate of inflation. To combat inflation, the
Federal Reserve Board slowed the money supply too rapidly, which was one of the fac-
tors resulting in the recession of the early 1980's. This recession was also caused by oil
tical monetary indices. If nonbank banks are excluded from the um-
brella of the Board's regulatory powers, monetary policy will be
affected. Nonbanks operating outside the banking system could slow
or distort the tools the Board uses to measure its monetary policy;171
thus, nonbanks can affect the Board's monetary policy.
Also, large nonbanks could operate in such a manner as to slow the
effectiveness of the Board's monetary policy. Again, if the Board
raises or allows the discount rate to rise, banks will be less willing to
lend and the economy should contract. 172 A large captive finance
nonbank bank would not be affected by this attempt to contract the
economy until the policy had affected banks first.173 An automobile
captive finance nonbank could issue commercial paper to fund its
loans instead of borrowing from banks. In this manner, monetary
policy could be slowed by circumventing the banks. The captive fi-
nance nonbank would cause the time lag in the Board's policy to be
lengthened. Yet, economists generally agree that financial markets
are very efficient and short term interest rates move quickly in re-
sponse to a change in policy or other external shocks. Thus, non-
banks may not actually hamper the Federal Reserve Board's
implementation of monetary policy.
Congress and the states must carefully evaluate the following ma-
jor concerns: the effects on commercial banks, the safety of the finan-
cial system, and the effects of nonbank banks on the Federal Reserve
Board and monetary policy. Regarding nonbank banks, the drafting
of the law and the effects of such laws are closely intertwined with
prices, deficit spending, and a strong dollar. After the recession, the inflation rate was
only 4-5%.
Thus, if nonbank banks have an effect on the measuring indices of the money sup-
ply, the Federal Reserve could theoretically be hampered in using monetary policy.
The Federal Reserve attempts to ameliorate distortions in the indices by monitoring
the aggregate money supply, individual indices, financial institutions, economic indica-
tors, and the overall economy. Id.
171. By distorting the indices of the money supply (M1, M2, and M3), the Board
would be hampered in its analysis of the indices. The indices can be distorted by a
combination of nonbank banks and the deregulation of the Depository Institutions De-
regulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(c), 1832(a), 3501-03
(1982). During the 1970's, economists thought that Money Market Demand Accounts
(MMDA's) would act as a substitute for transaction accounts, thus slowing the growth
of M1. Gittings, supra note 170. In the 1980's, the opposite effect occurred. When
NOW and SNOW accounts (Super NOW accounts) were authorized by the deregula-
tion act, people placed their money in these transactional accounts. The result was a
distorted M1 figure: the money supply grew at a faster rate than the overall economy.
The Federal Reserve referred to this phenomena as a "temporary shift in the demand
for money." Id. Although the nonbank banks by definition exist outside the regula-
tory framework of the Bank Holding Company Act, they should be viewed only as an-
other type of financial intermediary. Since most nonbank banks use the banking
system when they want to make a receipt deposit, they do not truly exist completely
outside the bank regulatory system. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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the financial and economic well-being of the United States. Policy-
makers must be careful in choosing a path for nonbanks.
V. CONCLUSION
The nonbank bank represents a new type of financial intermediary
in the United States financial system. By utilizing a structure that
avoids the regulations of the Bank Holding Company Act, the non-
bank bank has carved a new niche for itself in the areas of intrastate
and interstate banking. For financial consumers, the nonbank bank
is an essential and viable intermediary in a rapidly changing financial
system.
Nonbank banks provide financial consumers with a variety of fi-
nancial services absent the problems associated with the stodgy
banker and his irregular hours. Catalyzed by the technological infor-
mation wizardry of electronic banking, the nonbank bank represents
another stage in the standardization of the United States financial
system. Likewise, the nonbank bank presents a challenge to federal
and state legislators who are seeking to provide safety and central
control for the financial system. Yet, by allowing the nonbank bank
to operate outside the banking regulatory framework, Congress has
recognized the importance of balancing the interests of the financial
consumer and the safety of the financial system.
In the future, the nonbank bank may become regulated as Con-
gress feels the pressure of special banking interest groups. By then,
however, the nonbanks will have served the useful purpose of forcing
banks to respond to the needs of the financial consumer.
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